Sync init self-terminates the whole MCP server

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**Environment** | | | |---|---| | Plugin version | 2.11.3 (current `@latest`) | | MCP server version | 2.11.3, launched as `npx -y @weppy/roblox-mcp@latest` (stdio) | | AI client | Claude Code | | OS | Windows 11 Pro (build 26200) | | Node.js | v24.16.0 | | Roblox Studio | 0.732.0.7321040 | | Tier | PRO | | Place | ~4,500 instances, ~150 scripts, ~2.8 MB script source | **Steps** 1. Use a sync-enabled place on Windows. 2. Start a full sync from the plugin — manually, via auto-start on connect, or via the automatic sync restart after a playtest. All three triggers produced the failure here. 3. During sync init the server writes the observability changelog session file (`<syncRoot>\observability\changelog\sessions\sync-only_<placeId>_<minute>.jsonl`) via tmp-file + rename. When that rename fails with `EPERM`, the resulting unhandledRejection **shuts down the entire MCP server** 4. Frequency here: intermittent chunk-timeout failures on 2026-07-29/30 (second attempt passed), then escalation — six incidents total through 2026-08-02, including **every** sync start on 2026-08-01, on cold and warm servers, and after a full PC reboot (one clean sync right after the reboot, crashes resumed the next day). Working with sync disabled is completely stable on the same setup. ### Expected behavior - A failed write/rename of an observability/changelog file (`EPERM` is a normal, transient Windows condition — AV scans, concurrent handles) should be retried or skipped; it must never raise an unhandledRejection that shuts down the whole MCP server. - A chunk-upload timeout during `/sync/init` should be retried or fail the sync gracefully; it should never take the server process down. - The failure should be written to the observability file logs (it currently is not ### Actual behavior **Root cause captured (2026-08-02, server console output).** The process does not crash — it **shuts itself down on an unhandledRejection** raised by an **EPERM rename of the observability changelog session file** ~2.5 s into sync init: ``` [00:05:11] [INFO] Full sync started { totalServices: 11, totalInstances: 4412, ... } [00:05:13] [ERROR] Shutdown requested by unhandledRejection Error: EPERM: operation not permitted, rename '<syncRoot>\observability\changelog\sessions\sync-only_<placeId>_2026-08-02T00_05_00.000Z.jsonl.tmp-16388-<uuid>' -> '<syncRoot>\observability\changelog\sessions\sync-only_<placeId>_2026-08-02T00_05_00.000Z.jsonl' at async Object.rename (node:internal/fs/promises:785:10) at async zfe (dist/index.js:68:595) at async fn (dist/index.js:68:843) at async (dist/index.js:82:286) at async G8 (dist/index.js:82:318) at async Wl (dist/index.js:93:1476) at async J9 (dist/index.js:533:4588) [00:05:13] [INFO] Stopping MCP Server [00:05:18] [ERROR] Shutdown timed out, forcing process exit ``` This is consistent with every symptom of the other incidents: the plugin-side `Failed to send chunk N/M … Request timeout: /sync/init` (the server is shutting down mid-init), the silent death, and why only sync start triggers it (that is when the session file is written). The console was only visible for THIS incident; the earlier ones match the same external fingerprint but their console output was not captured. **All dated occurrences** | Date (UTC) | Plugin UI message / source | Outcome | |---|---|---| | 2026-07-29 | `Failed to send chunk 17/35 for ServerStorage: Request timeout: /sync/init` | immediate second attempt completed | | 2026-07-30 (session start) | `Failed to send chunk 20/35 for ServerStorage: Request timeout: /sync/init` | immediate second attempt completed | | **2026-07-31 ~18:50** | `Failed to send chunk 5/8 for Workspace: Request timeout: /sync/init` (manual sync start) | **MCP server process died**; `http://127.0.0.1:3002/status` refuses; `/mcp` restart recovers | | **2026-08-01 10:37–11:30** | (no UI message captured; log ends silently after `Auto-starting sync...`) | **three sync starts, zero completed; at least two server deaths** | | **2026-08-01 23:54** | Studio buffer: `Failed to send chunk 1/36 for ServerStorage` (sync auto-restart after a playtest) | **server process died** | | **2026-08-02 00:05** | server console captured — excerpt above | **EPERM → unhandledRejection → self-shutdown** | **File-level forensics, verified minutes after the 2026-08-02 death (facts)** - The rename TARGET file exists with **14 entries**, all timestamped `00:05:11.555–.590` (during the full sync), and its mtime is `00:05:13` — the death second. So at least one earlier flush cycle onto the same target had succeeded before a later rename got EPERM. - No `.tmp-…` leftover remained in `changelog\sessions`, and the target file was **no longer locked** when tested afterwards. The lock holder at the moment of the EPERM is therefore **not identifiable after the fact** — the entries carry no instance/pid markers. - No weppy node process was left running after the forced exit. **Already ruled out** - [x] Native crash — no Windows Error Reporting event and no crash dump for node.exe across all incidents (36 h window checked, `%LOCALAPPDATA%\CrashDumps` empty); the shutdown is deliberate. - [x] Corrupt sync index (the fixed 2.11.1 issue) — `.sync-index.json` was intact (4.16 MB) during the incidents. - [x] Place size / payload — the same place completed full syncs fine before 2026-07-29 and once after a reboot (4,372 instances / 157 scripts). - [x] Stale process/system state — reproduced within a day after a full PC reboot. - [x] Cold-start-only — incident #3 on 2026-08-01 hit a warm, freshly reconnected server. **Unverified candidates for the EPERM itself (hypotheses, not needed for the fix):** (a) a second MCP instance — one registered in client mode 3 s before the 2026-08-02 death, both instances share the data dir, and the session filename is minute-bucketed, so concurrent writers are possible; (b) an AV/indexer briefly locking the just-replaced `.jsonl`/`.tmp`. We could not distinguish these afterwards. What IS actionable regardless of the lock holder: a telemetry write failure must not take the server down. **The failure never reaches the FILE logs.** Both `observability/logs/current.log` and the daily plugin log simply **end at the last successful entry** before each death: ``` [2026-07-31 18:47:57] [INFO] Executed: manage_camera_screenshot (803ms) [2026-07-31 18:48:13] [INFO] Executed: execute_luau (1ms) <end of file — sync started from plugin around 18:50, chunk 5/8 timeout shown in UI, server process dead, nothing further logged> ``` ``` [2026-08-01 11:26:29] [INFO] Session ID: <…> [2026-08-01 11:26:29] [INFO] MCP Version: 2.11.3 [2026-08-01 11:26:29] [INFO] Auto-starting sync... <end of file — server process dead shortly after (port 3002 refuses connections)> ``` **But the in-Studio log buffer (plugin-side, `manage_logs`) survives server deaths** and holds the full pre-death sequence — pull it after a `/mcp` restart when reproducing. Example, the 2026-08-01 23:54 incident (sync auto-restart after a playtest): ``` [SyncManager] stopSync begin: state=idle ... (23:54:14, post-playtest) [SyncManager] Error: Failed to send chunk 1/36 for ServerStorage: Request timeout: init (23:54:45) [SyncManager] init session cleanup failed: Request timeout: stop [SyncWatcher] Stopped <server still answered pings for ~3 more minutes, then process gone — port 3002 refuses> ``` One earlier sequence (~23:26 UTC 2026-08-01, silent background reconnect + sync auto-start) also contained a plugin-side error — offered as data, it appeared only this once and may be a symptom of an already-unresponsive server rather than a cause: ``` [WeppyRobloxMCP] Command channel connection attempt started... ERROR: cannot spawn non-suspended coroutine with arguments Stack: Script 'user_WeppyRobloxMCP.rbxm.WeppyRobloxMCP.CommandChannel.WsTransport', Line 12 [SyncManager] Error: Failed to send chunk 18/35 for ServerStorage: Request timeout: init ``` Possibly related context (cause unproven, offered as data): silent WebSocket reconnects became much more frequent on this setup in the same period — `current.log` shows `Reconnecting...` with no preceding error (15.06–23.07: 0–3/day at higher activity; 30.07: five; 31.07: five). Each reconnect returns ~1 s later with a new session ID.